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Subchapter S, An Entrepreneurial
Survival Strategy for Small Banks

Steven G. Craig*
and
Polly T. Hardee**

With the passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, many small banks throughout
the United States became eligible to reorganize as a Subchapter S corporation. This allows these
banks to eliminate double taxation, and increase shareholder value. Consequently, employing this
entrepreneurial survival tool extends “new life” to the small bank. Accompanying this strategy are
differences in corporate governance, primarily more concentration of ownership. Thus, this paper
examines the behavior of Subchapter S banks as compared to banks of similar size in order to
determine significant performance differences. It also focuses on bank structure and small business
lending activity, an area of high asset concentration in small banks. Overall, we find shareholder
value appears to increase in a Subchapter S banking organization through higher earnings, larger
dividend payout ratios, and similar risk measures. We find little differences in these banks in
relation to small business lending. The implications are that a small bank’s survival rate will be
higher in the consolidation process by employing the Subchapter S strategy.

* Steven Craig received his Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania, and has worked in a variety of applied
microeconomic topics concerned with public policy, public sector behavior, and urban economic growth. Much of
his work has policy implications, and has appeared in public policy outlets as well as prestigious academic journals.
The empirical work has utilized a wide variety of data sets, including large survey data sources. Dr. Craig has been a
Professor of Economics at the University of Houston since 1981, where he is currently Co-Director of the Institute
for the Study of Political Economy.
** Polly Hardee received her Ph.D. from the University of Houston in 1997, after a successful career in the banking
industry working for independent banks. She has worked as an adjunct professor in the Department of Economics,
teaching Money and Banking as well as International Monetary Policy Analysis. Dr. Hardee’s research interests are
in the area of banking and its effects on the economy, and especially small businesses. She is currently working on
the small firm behavior using a national survey of small firms as well as a national banking and bank holding
company data set.
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Introduction
Passage of the Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996 was one of the few times a piece of
legislation actually accomplished what its title implied--i.e., it protected or preserved the jobs of
community bankers in the bank consolidation process. Through entrepreneurial loop-hole mining of
the law, these bankers realized they could exploit an opportunity that would increase the likelihood
of survival, in an otherwise rather dismal outlook for many small banks. The sponsors of this Act, as
an unintended consequence, allowed small banks throughout the United States to become eligible to
reorganize as a Subchapter S corporation. This created value for the banks’ owners by avoiding
double taxation of earnings, thereby making ownership of the small bank more lucrative relative to
the alternative of merger into a larger financial institution. Thus, it slowed the consolidation process.
In a Subchapter S reorganization the shareholders are limited partners for tax purposes, and
the bank or bank holding company is the general partner. Although the legal liability of the owners
remains the same, the tax status changes greatly. In effect, the pretax corporate earnings are
allocated to the owners according to their pro-rata share, with these earnings taxed at the individual
level only. This allows these banks to eliminate the taxation of earnings at both the firm level via
corporate rates, and the individual level via marginal rates on bank dividends. Therefore, in a
Subchapter S bank, what was previously paid in bank taxes, is now eligible to be distributed to
owners, thereby increasing shareholder pre-tax cash receipts. Thus, if funds a bank previously paid in
taxes are now distributed to the owners, and the shareholder’s allocated portion of corporate taxable
earnings is less or equal to the cash distributions received, shareholder value is unambiguously
increased.1 That is, greater after tax “dividends” result.
In order to qualify for a Subchapter S bank, no more than 75 shareholders are allowed.
Consequently, small banks with many shareholders need shareholder approval to convert, and with
that approval require shareholders in excess of 75 to relinquish their shares.2 This can be an arduous
process. However, for financial institutions that did effectively reorganize their ownership structure
to meet the Subchapter S criteria, “new life” was extended to the small bank. Previous to the Act,
many small banks were being consolidated into larger banking organizations in order to exploit
economies of scale. Accordingly, many banks converted to this new type of ownership, rather than
merging into a larger organization or exiting the industry (Harvey and Padget, 2000). As of June
2000 over 18% of small banks were classed as Subchapter S.
Small banks, due to capital and local market constraints devote higher percentages of their
commercial lending portfolios to small businesses (Jayaratne and Wolken, 1999; Peek and
Rosengren, 1998). Prior research has shown they have a comparative advantage in that market
(Craig and Hardee, 2000, 2001; Keeton, 1996, 1995). This raises the question, “Does this new type
of structure, with more concentrated ownership, result in significant behavioral differences in these
community banks, particularly in relation to small business lending? This question becomes even
1

Subchapter S banks may limit its distributions to less than its taxable income. If the bank has grown, it may have
to retain some taxable earnings to build capital. That is, the owner is taxed on earnings of the bank for which he did
not receive a distribution. Thus it is possible that a shareholder can be taxed on bank earnings without receiving
commensurate distributions, resulting in lower after tax returns than prior to the Subchapter S conversion. Although
this is unlikely, (since it destroys the incentive to convert structures), the equality of taxable income to distributions
received eliminates the ambiguity.
2
Legislation is pending to increase that number to 150 shareholders (Harvey and Padget, 2000).
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more germane, considering the concern that small firms, a major engine of growth for the U.S.
economy, will continue to have adequate access to credit as the banking sector progresses through its
consolidation process (Berger & Udell, 1995). Since theory does not serve as a guide, empirical
research is necessary to explore if this change in corporate governance is accompanied by changes in
bank behavior. Thus this paper examines Subchapter S banks, as compared to banks of similar size
in order to determine significant performance differences, including small business lending--an area
of high asset concentration in small banks.
We investigate this issue using univariate financial ratio analysis relating primarily to
earnings, leverage and capital adequacy across the two bank groups. In addition to financial
variables in a multivariate framework, we also focus on the bank structure and activity of small
business lending, an important asset component of small banks. The majority of banks are under a
holding company structure. Thus the banking organization at the holding company level is examined
where appropriate.3 Our analysis proceeds with a section establishing our conceptual framework and
methodology, followed by our data description, and finally, our results. Overall we find that
Subchapter S banks do have much stronger financial performance than their counterpart, but have no
significant differences in small business loan behavior. Thus, reorganization under this tax loophole,
appears to have created added value and life to the small bank.
I.
A.

Conceptual Framework and Methodology
Univariate Analysis
A shareholder would be inclined to maintain his investment in a small bank if his returns
were greater than a substitute investment without incurring greater risk. Accordingly, through
univariate analysis, we compare return and risk variables across the two banking groups. We
measure increased shareholder value by testing differences in means on specific financial
performance ratios. Profitability measures include return on assets and return on equity, before and
after tax, at both the bank and holding company level. Dividend payout ratios are also compared as
well as bank and holding company taxes. Risk measures include loan quality, debt-to-equity and
capital adequacy. These provide some indication of the soundness of the bank’s primary earning
asset, its leverage exposure, and its capital cushion in the event of losses. Balance sheet asset ratios
are also included to test differences in primary and secondary sources of liquidity, as well as
investment in loans and deposit funding sources. Bank structure variables, though examined in
greater detail in relation to small business lending (SBL), are also included in this univariate setting.
B.

Multivariate Analysis
Analysis of SBL is based on multivariate regression analysis under a private information
versus diversity hypothesis. That is, small, more simply structured banking organizations may
experience a comparative advantage in SBL due to their relative ease in obtaining and processing
private information inherent in this market (Nakamura, 1994). Conversely larger, more complex
3

The holding company is not required to be a Subchapter S corporate structure if its member bank(s) is so
organized. Nevertheless, most holding companies having Subchapter S member banks are also organized as
Subchapter S corporations.
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structured banks may be in a position to take more risk investing in SBL due to their diversity
advantage (Strahan and Weston, 1998). Furthermore, advanced technologies such as credit scoring
have strengthened this advantage (Mester, 1997). Our empirical work, therefore, seeks to explain
SBL both as a function of the attributes that affect a bank’s ability to process private information,
and its diversification improving its ability to tolerate risk. Our hypothesis is that larger banks and/or
those with more complex structures will process private information less well but nonetheless will
have a greater ability to diversify. Small, simple banks may be able to better process private
information, but clearly will not have the relative ability to diversify risk. Regarding Subchapter S
banks, we are unclear as to the role of our competing hypotheses. On the one hand, fewer
shareholders may imply less involvement in the community, thus a smaller private information pool
dampening SBL. On the other hand, the improved tax position may generate a greater emphasis on
the higher earnings in this market (versus investment in less risky assets such as bonds) encouraging
the building of long-term customer relationships with small business firms. Our reduced form
specification is:
SBL = f (BANK SIZE, HOLDING COMPANY ORGANIZATION, EXTENT OF BRANCHING, LOCATION )
The first three sets of variables--bank size, holding company organization and extent of
branching--capture larger size and complexity of structure, thereby implying greater diversification;
whereas small size and simplicity of structure imply better private information. Location of the
main banking office in urban versus rural markets control for differences in demand and growth.
The state in which the bank is domiciled is also used in order to control for differences in market and
operating conditions across state boundaries. Included in our general category of location are
variables for bank age, to control for performance differences inherent in newly formed banks
(Goldberg and DeYoung, 1999; Goldberg and White, 1998; Sullivan, 2000). Bank age also controls
for length of time to establish a reputation and to gather information in the community. Additionally,
a variable measuring the effect of transactional Internet Web sites is part of location, since this
technology transcends local market boundaries.
C.

Multivariate Dependent SBL Variables
Our tests use two alternative measures of lending activity to illustrate the extent to which the
institutional variables described above alter banks’ participation in a market that is presumably bank
dependent for credit. Since most of these banks have no business loans over $100,000, we use the
natural log of SBL not exceeding $100,000 as our standard dependent variable [Ln (SBL100)].4
The second measure of SBL activity in our view presents a clearer test of bank size as a
determinate in our competing hypotheses. Small banks may specialize in SBL because capital
constraints limit these banks’ participation in the large loan market. The default of a large loan can
render a small bank insolvent. Thus in our second measure we put capital constraints aside by
4

Results for SBL of $1,000,000 and below, the largest small business loan category, are qualitatively the same. In
order to avoid undue reporting burdens upon the banks, small businesses are defined by the size of their original loan
amount, rather than the size of the firm. Size of the business rather than size of the loan is a preferred measure.
However, Scanlon (1984) has indicated that original loan size serves as a good proxy for borrower size.
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disaggregating SBL into the difference between the natural log of small commercial and industrial
(SCI) loans and small commercial real estate (SCRE) loans [Ln (SCI/SCRE)]. This last distinction
is particularly important, since assessing credit risk may be more difficult in SCI loans as compared
to SCRE. Real estate collateral is generally straightforward to appraise, improves loan liquidity, and
allows for easier assessment of risk exposure. Under conditions of stable or rising real estate prices
SCRE loans require less monitoring. So, real estate may be obtained as collateral perhaps to
overcome information gaps; whereas SCI loans include unsecured loans, or monitor-intensive loans
made in some cases solely on the character of the borrower. Hence, they encompass relationship
driven credits. Thus, the more information sensitive subset of small business loans are SCI as
opposed to SBL secured by commercial real estate.
D.

Economies of Scale
We also test economies of scale by using our multivariate framework to determine if
earnings improve across our two banking sectors as the bank or the holding company increases in
size, while controlling for our remaining structure variables5. Our measures are before tax earnings
on assets and equity at both the bank and holding company levels. We use before tax earnings, since
this is a more realistic measure of profitability across the two banking sectors. After tax earnings,
though not reported, produce qualitatively the same results. However, due to the favorable tax
treatment of the Subchapter S banks, mean after tax returns are substantially higher.
II.

Data Description
At the holding company level, data for this research are extracted from the Federal Reserve
Bank Holding Company file. We use the direct holder, rather than the highest holder of the bank,
since the direct holder, if different from the highest holder, generally has a much larger percentage of
ownership. At the bank level data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.’s Bank Call
report file. Both are as of June 30, 2000, the annual reporting date for SBL. Holding company and
bank data are merged into one data set. For purposes of standardization, the holding company
unconsolidated parent financial statements are used, since small holding companies submit only
these types of statement. Specifically, the statements include balance sheets, income statements and
changes in equity capital. Banks with total assets of $100 million and less are used, since average
assets across the two banking sectors are essentially the same, and are unarguably small banks.6
Banks not having any business lending or which make only large business loans are eliminated. This
results in approximately 5100 banks (over half of the total banking population) across the U.S. and
its protectorates.7 We employ a semi-logarithmic OLS model in our multivariate specification.
Where the OLS regression errors are heteroscedastic (as determined by the White test), we report the
robust errors as taken from the White heteroscedasticity-consistent variance-covariance matrix.
Definitions of all the dependent and independent variables are presented in Table I.
5

Admittedly, the most desirable test for economies of scale is to estimate a long run average cost curve, which
exceeds the scope of this paper.
6
Including all Subchapter S banks involve 41 banks that have assets in excess of $300 million--a size outside of
small bank parameters. However, results on this larger sample size are similar.
7
Banks having no small business lending are primarily foreign bank branch offices and credit card banks.
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III.

Empirical Results
Our results indicate significant differences in means of the financial variables across the two
banking groups, with Subchapter S banks having a stronger performance. Small business lending
activity does not differ greatly between the sectors, but as in previous research (Craig and Hardee,
2000, 2001) evidence weighs more towards the private information hypothesis, though elements of
diversity do exist. Economies of scale are experienced as the bank size grow larger, more
particularly when measured at the bank level versus the holding company level. And, in support of
the stronger financial performance of the Subchapter S banks, mean earnings are higher at both the
bank and holding company levels, when controlling for other structural differences. All of this taken
together, indicate added shareholder value in the Subchapter S structure, thereby postponing their
demise in the consolidation process. The specific findings are presented below.
A.
Univariate Analysis
As reflected in Table II, the Subchapter S banks and holding companies (HC) predictably, show
much higher dividend payout ratios and lower taxes.8 Additionally, these organizations have higher
earnings than their counterpart. Profitability measures reflect higher mean earnings with differences
statistically significant at the 1% level. Both bank and HC return on assets (ROA) and return on
equity (ROE) are more favorable in the SubS sector. This is true not only after tax, but before taxes
(BT) as well. Net interest margins are also more favorable.
Risk measures, as captured by leverage in the debt-to-equity ratios, capital adequacy and loan
quality are more weighted towards SubS banks, though with some differences, primarily in lower
capital at the bank level. Capital adequacy, or bank capital as a percentage of assets, is 1.03% lower
at SubS banks at the 1% significance level. Presumably this is attributable to capital expended in
shareholder buy out to qualify for SubS conversion, as well as lower retained earnings due to higher
dividend payouts. However, the ratio of 10.1% for these banks is still ample. A 10% capital
adequacy ratio for a small bank is deemed ample by regulatory standards (Harvey and Padget, 2000).
While capital adequacy is lower at the bank level, it is significantly higher at the holding company
level. Accordingly, debt-to-equity at the bank level is higher for the SubS structure, but is lower at
the holding company level.
A final measure of risk is loan quality, as represented by the allowance for loan losses (a
reserve account) as a percentage of total loans, the provision for loan losses (addition to the reserve
account) as a percentage of total loans, and net charged off loans as a percentage of total loans. The
higher these ratios, the lower the loan quality. In all three measures, the ratios were lower at SubS
banks, and the difference statistically significant, implying better credit quality in the loan portfolios.
8

We expected assets allocated to tax free municipal bonds to be higher at Subchapter S banks, perhaps motivated by
the bank’s desire to allocate more tax free income to the shareholder. That is, if a SubS bank is to retain some of its
earnings to meet capital adequacy requirements, it may withhold its income from municipal bonds, and distribute
only its taxable income to the shareholders. Thus the owners do not experience a lower after tax return by being
taxed on bank earnings on which no cash distribution is received. Although the mean MUNI/TA ratio is higher at
SubS banks, it is not statistically significant.
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In terms of balance sheet structure, cash-to-assets is lower for the SubS sector at both the
bank and holding company level. This could be due to the buy out of the smaller shareholders in the
reorganization process. However bonds-to-assets, a secondary source of liquidity is significantly
higher (perhaps to account for lower cash liquidity). Bank loans-to-assets are about the same across
the two sectors, indicating equal participation in this higher earning portfolio investment, while
deposits-to-assets, a cheaper funding source, is higher for the SubS sector.
Small business lending in lower loan levels is higher in SubS banks. That is, a higher
percentage of total assets are devoted to SBL $100,000 and less (SBL100/TA). As these loans
become larger, the non SubS banks ratio becomes greater. Additionally, more informationally
sensitive C&I lending is done in both small and larger SBL loans in the SubS group.
In terms of holding company (HC) structure, SubS banks have a more HC organizations than
their counterpart, with these HCs having much smaller asset size. They are typically one bank
holding companies, as opposed to multi-bank holding companies (MBHC) or those holding
companies domiciled out of state (OUTSIDE BHC). Ostensibly, the one bank holding company
eases the burden of converting multiple banks to a SubS organization. Tiering or layering of HC
organizations (MULTI-LAYERED) are statistically no different across the two sectors. No SubS
banks have holding companies owned by a majority of foreign investors and significantly fewer are
publicly traded.
SubS banks are located more in rural areas, are longer established relative their counterpart,
and offer fewer Internet banking capabilities--(although this difference is only about 1%). SubS
banks have about as many unit banks (a bit more than half), but if organized as a branch bank, do not
differ significantly in the average number of branch offices.
B.

Multivariate Analysis--SBL
In the small business lending regression results (Table III), Subchapter S banks, while
controlling for other structural differences of size, holding company organization, branching and
market do not reveal statistically significant differences. Thus, smaller shareholder numbers appear
not to affect the degree of activity in SBL. However, as with previous research (Craig and Hardee,
2000, 1999) the private information hypothesis does appear to dominate, although diversity does
come through on some variables. This holds even though our prior research included the entire
banking population, whereas this sample is limited to smaller sized small banks.9 Predictably, as
banks grow larger (as measured by the natural log of total assets--Ln ta), they do increase their
investment in SBL. However, as rural banks grow larger they are participating less in the
informational sensitive SBL over those secured by real estate, perhaps to overcome informational
disadvantages. Banks in a holding company organization have higher investment in SBL over the no
holding company bank (the omitted dummy variable). Although this appears to support the diversity
hypothesis in that these organizations may be more complex, as the holding company grows in size
(Hclogta), the effect is negative. Also in support of private information is the negative and
9

A small bank may be considered to be $300 million or less in asset size. Thus, this research is confined to the
smaller subset of small banks.
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significant outcome on the majority of foreign ownership and publicly traded holding companies.
Presumably banks with foreign owned holding companies may be more complex and be less inclined
to be community oriented, thus gathering less private information inherent in SBL. Additionally, a
publicly traded holding company adds another layer of complexity. Foreign owned entities do take
less commercial real estate as collateral, but it can be argued that the nature of their lending may be
more biased toward international business and trade, and would fall under the C&I category.
Notwithstanding, the diversity hypothesis does gain support in that the branch bank dummy variable
is positive and significant. However, overall, we feel the private information does outweigh
diversity, though elements of the latter do exist.
C.

Multivariate Analysis--Economies of Scale
Table IV reflects the dependent variables of before tax bank return on assets (BT--bkroa) and
return on equity (BT--bkroe) whereas Table V reflects these same measures at the holding company
level (BT--HCroa and BT--HCroe). The right hand side, or bank structure variables are the same as
in the SBL regressions. Here, we see that as the banks grow in size, returns to the banks improve as
well as the holding company, with the exception of BT--HCroe in rural banks. As the holding
company grows in size, it makes no difference to bank returns, but yields mixed results to the
holding company returns--negative and significant in the BT-HCroa regression while positive and
significant in the BT-HCroe regression. Since the performance of SubS banks is the main interest in
this paper, we focus more on the bank returns. Thus, this rather simplistic measure of economies of
scale does seem to hold at the bank level. In addition, on all four regressions, the dummy variable
for SubS banks is positive and significant, indicating even in a multivariate environment controlling
for structural differences, the more favorable earnings of these banks hold.
IV.

Conclusion
In summary, shareholder value appears to increase in a Subchapter S bank through higher
earnings, larger dividend payout ratios, and stronger loan quality. Although capital adequacy is
lower at the bank level, it remains ample; and is higher at the holding company level. In terms of
small business lending as tested via the information versus diversity hypothesis, mixed results are
obtained. On balance private information dominates diversity, with no major differences between
SubS banks and their counterpart under the two hypotheses. Thus, smaller, more simply structured
banks appear to have a comparative advantage in small business lending, even when the sample is
relegated to smaller-sized small banks. Taken as a whole, the stronger financial performance of
SubS banks coupled with similar participation in SBL relative to their counterpart, bodes well for
these institutions. Therefore, implications of this research are that many smaller banks are likely to
survive the consolidation process over the long run, given the Subchapter S tax advantage remains a
legislative option.
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TABLE I
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
RHS VARIABLES

DEFINITION

Size Variable
Ln ta

the natural log of the bank’s total assets

Ln ta Urban

the natural log of the bank’s total assets interacted with an
urban dummy variable

Holding Company
Variables

The omitted variable is unaffiliated banks--i.e., banks
without any holding company structure, or “No-HoldingCompany-Banks”

Bhc1bank

a dummy variable for membership in a single bank holding
company domiciled in the same state as the member bank

Instate-mbhc

a dummy variable for membership in a multibank holding
company domiciled within the state of the member bank

Outside bhc

a dummy variable for membership in a bank holding
company located outside the state of the member bank

HClogta

the natural log of (total assets of the highest holding
company less the equity share*bank’s assets)

Multilayer

a dummy variable for a tiering relationship in a bank
holding companyB multiple holding company levels

Publicly traded

a dummy variable a bank holding company whose equity
shares are publically traded in the capital markets.

Majforeign

a dummy variable for over 50% foreign ownership at the
holding company or bank level

Branching
Variables

For the dummy variable, unit banks (banks having no
branches) is the omitted variable

Branchbank

a dummy variable if the bank has at least one banking office
in addition to its main location.

Ln office number

the natural log of number of branches of a particular bank
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TABLE I (CONT.)
EXPLANATORY VARIABLE DEFINITIONS

RHS VARIABLES

DEFINITION

Location, Age
Urban

a dummy variable equaling one for an urban location of the
main office of the bank, zero otherwise

Lnbankage

the natural log of the time in years since the bank was
chartered

LnbankageUrban

the natural log of the time in years since the bank was
chartered interacted with an urban dummy variable

INET Bank

a dummy variable equaling one for banks having
transactional internet web site, zero otherwise

SubS Bank

a dummy variable equaling one for banks classed as a
Subchapter S corporation, zero otherwise
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TABLE II
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
Variable

MeanBSub S Bank
N=1077

MeanBNon Sub S Bank
N=4041

Difference of Means

47,876

47,550

326.8

54.07%

15.94%

38.03%***

Bank TAXES (000's)

18.981

97.160

-78.179***

Taxes/TA--Bank

0.04%

0.18%

-0.14%***

HC TAXES (000's)

14.045

904.85

-890.81***

Taxes/Equity--HC

0.07%

0.36%

-0.29%***

Bank MUNIS/TA

4.48%

4.27%

0.21%

Bank ROA

0.79%

0.36%

0.43%***

Bank ROA--BT

0.83%

0.54%

0.29%***

HC ROA

7.90%

4.20%

3.70%***

HC ROA--BT

7.21%

3.31%

3.90%***

Bank ROE

8.52%

4.00%

4.52%***

Bank ROE--BT

8.95%

5.88%

3.07%***

HC ROE

8.62%

4.43%

4.19%***

HC ROE--BT

8.69%

4.79%

3.90%***

Bank NIM/TA

2.09%

2.02%

0.07%***

Bank NIM/Equity

22.35%

19.95%

2.40%***

BANK SIZE
Total Assets (Mill.)
DIVIDEND PAYOUT
TAXES

PROFITABILITY

NET INTEREST
MARGINS (NIM)

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE II (CONT.)
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
Variable

MeanBSub S Bank
N=1077

MeanBNon Sub S Bank
N=4041

Difference of Means

Bank D/E

55.06%

47.07%

7.99%***

HC D/E

7.59%

9.53%

-1.94%***

Allowance for
Losses/Loans

1.41%

1.51%

0.10%***

Provision for
Losses/Loans

0.14%

0.22%

0.08%***

Actual Losses/Loans

0.07%

0.11%

0.04%**

Bank Cash/TA

4.81%

5.13%

-0.32%**

HC Cash/TA

1.94%

2.25%

-0.31%*

Bank BONDS/TA

28.37%

26.23%

2.14%***

Bank LOANS/TA

59.86%

60.03%

-0.17%

DEPOSITS/TA

84.65%

83.48%

1.17%***

Bank CAPITAL/TA

10.59%

12.00%

-1.41%***

HC CAPITAL/TA

76.37%

63.08%

13.29%***

SBL100/TA

10.23%

9.11%

1.12%***

SBL1MILL/TA

16.73%

17.77%

-1.04%***

(SCI-SCRE/TA)
$100,000 or less

3.09%

2.69%

0.40%***

(SCI-SCRE/TA)
$1 million or less

2.39%

1.34%

1.05%***

DEBT/EQUITY

LOAN QUALITY

BALANCE SHEET
STRUCTURE

SBL

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE II (CONT.)
DIFFERENCE IN MEANS
All banks with Ta’s <=100,000,000 and SBL>0
Variable

MeanBSub S Bank
N=1077

MeanBNon Sub S
Bank
N=4041

Difference of Means

HC Total Assets

37,048

308,240

-271,192**

BHC BANK

82.92%

68.99%

12.93%***

ONE BANK HC

63.33%

45.43%

17.90%***

IN STATE MBHC

17.27%

19.40%

-2.13%***

OUTSIDE BHC

3.15%

4.73%

-1.58%***

MULTI-LAYERED

13.18%

11.48%

1.70%

FOREIGN OWNED

0.00%

0.47%

-0.53%**

PUBLICLY
TRADED

7.52%

11.16%

-3.54%***

BRANCH BANK

53.02%

52.34%

0.68%

OFFICE NUMBER

1.90

2.00

-0.10

26.37%

36.15%

-9.78%***

BANK AGE

72.90

62.18

10.72***

INTERNET BANK

4.08%

5.15%

-1.07%

HC STRUCTURE

BRANCHING

URBAN

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.
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TABLE III
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
NATURAL LOG OF SBL
Dependent Variable:

Ln SBL100
N=5118
R5=.448

Ln(SCI100/
SCRE100)

N=5118
R2= .178

===========
Independent

All Banks

Variable

Coefficient

Robust

Coefficient

Robust

Name

Estimate

Error

Estimate

Error

===========
Intercept

All Banks

======

=====

======

======

-2.9586***

0.3495

4.6949***

0.6615

Ln ta

1.0250***

0.0332

-0.32361***

0.0634

Ln ta--urban10

0.9507***

0.0566

0.0723

0.1047

Bhc1bank

1.1364***

0.1654

0.1628

0.3446

Instate-mbhc

1.2181***

0.1920

0.0440

0.4004

Outside-bhc

1.0759***

0.2039

0.0383

0.4303

-0.1120***

0.0197

-0.0113

0.0406

0.0609

0.0407

-0.0206

0.0769

Majority foreign

-1.1398***

0.2891

2.2614***

0.7045

Publicly traded

-0.1534***

0.0493

0.1097

0.0809

0.1776***

0.0498

0.0121

0.1047

0.0246

0.0475

-0.0197

0.0985

0.2622

0.6179

-3.06477***

1.1141

-0.0052

0.0148

-0.1033***

0.0264

SIZE

HOLDING CO.

HClogta
Multilayer

BRANCHING
Branchbank
Ln office number
LOCATION
Urban
Lnbankage
LnbankageUrban

0.1077***

0.0207

-0.3072***

0.0380

INET Bank

-0.0195

0.0613

0.17431

0.1118

SubS Bank

0.0383

0.0280

-0.08514

0.0567

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.

State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported.

10

This variable is the interaction of Ln ta and urban. Thus, Ln ta represents size for rural banks, and this variable
size for urban banks. The reported coefficient is the sum of the actual coefficients on the Ln ta variable and the
interaction variable from the original regression. The robust errors have been adjusted to equal (Variance Lnta +
VarianceLn ta urban +2*Covariance)2 . The remaining interaction variable has not been adjusted and is reported as the
original regression.
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TABLE IV
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
Bank ROA & ROE, Before Tax
DependentVariable

BT-bkroa

BT-bkroe

N=5112
R5=.449

N=5112
R5=.146

Independent

All Banks

Variable

Coefficient

Robust

Coefficient

Robust

Name

Estimate

Error

Estimate

Error

===========
Intercept

======

All Banks

======

======

======

-0.0173***

0.0042

-0.2457***

0.0773

0.0016***

0.0004

0.0250***

0.0070

0.0049***

0.0006

0.0243***

0.0076

Bhc1bank

-0.0041

0.0037

0.1264

0.0910

Instate-mbhc

-0.0037

0.0043

0.1578

0.1078

Outside-bhc

-0.0048

0.0043

0.1434

0.1063

0.0005

0.0004

-0.0137

0.0110

-0.0007**

0.0003

0.0049

0.0062

Majority foreign

0.0012

0.0032

-0.0382

0.0277

Publicly traded

-0.0003

0.0004

0.0050

0.0063

0.0003

0.0004

0.0076*

0.0046

-0.0019***

0.0004

-0.0070

0.0054

-0.0380***

0.0064

-0.0126

0.0800

0.0025***

0.0002

0.0113***

0.0011

0.0007**

0.0003

0.0058***

0.0016

INET Bank

-0.0014**

0.0006

-0.0145***

0.0048

SubS Bank

0.0013***

0.0002

0.0176***

0.0030

SIZE
Ln ta
11

Ln ta--urban

HOLDING CO.

HClogta
Multilayer

BRANCHING
Branchbank
Ln office number
LOCATION
Urban
Lnbankage
LnbankageUrban

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported.
11

This variable is the interaction of Ln ta and urban. Thus, Ln ta represents size for rural banks, and this variable
size for urban banks. The reported coefficient is the sum of the actual coefficients on the Ln ta variable and the
interaction variable from the original regression. The robust errors have been adjusted to equal (Variance Lnta +
VarianceLn ta urban +2*Covariance)2 . The remaining interaction variable has not been adjusted and is reported as the
original regression.
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TABLE V
MULTIVARIATE REGRESSIONS
Holding Company ROA & ROE, Before Tax
Dependent Variable

Independent
Variable
Name
===========
Intercept
SIZE
Ln ta
Ln ta--urban
HOLDING CO.
Bhc1bank
Instate-mbhc
Outside-bhc
HClogta
Multilayer
Majority foreign
Publicly traded
BRANCHING
Branchbank
Ln office number
LOCATION
Urban
Lnbankage
LnbankageUrban
INET Bank
SubS Bank

BT-HCroa
BT-HCroe
N=3672
N=3672
R5=.282
R5=.032
All Banks
All Banks
Coefficient
Robust
Coefficient
Standard
Estimate
Error
Estimate
Error
======
======
======
======
0.0124
0.0170
0.0511
0.0624
0.0063***
0.0103***

0.0022
0.0028

-0.0116*
0.0221**

0.0068
0.0106

0.0111***
n/a
n/a
0.0004
-0.0058***
0.0058***
-0.0039
-0.0007

0.0023

-0.0060

0.0084

n/a

n/a

0.0028
0.0017
0.0024
0.0087
0.0020

-0.0036
0.0129***
0.0007
-0.0130
0.0023

0.0127
0.0038
0.0084
0.0589
0.0088

-0.0005
0.0004

0.0026
0.0025

0.0006
-0.0009

0.0113
0.0103

-0.1366***
0.0042***
0.0061***
-0.0110***
0.0317***

0.0284
0.0010
0.0017
0.0040
0.0017

-0.2601**
0.0056*
0.0072
-0.0095
0.0391***

0.1125
0.0034
0.0043
0.0128
0.0064

*** Significant at the 1% level;**Significant at the 5% level;*Significant at the 10% level.
State dummy variables are included in all regressions, but are not reported.

